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Biology’s Misuse Potential 
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Department of Social Science, Health & Medicine, King's College London 
http://kcl.ac.uk 
Abstract: The international community has laid down clear red lines about 
the use of biology to enhance national armaments. Advances in biosci-
ence and biomedicine are, however, significantly eroding technological 
barriers to acquiring and using biological weapons. This article describes 
recent scientific trends and analyses their security implications. Three 
emerging fields of research that have particularly high potential for mis-
use are considered in more detail: potentially pandemic pathogens, syn-
thetic biology and neurobiology. It is argued that continued efforts are 
required in multilateral, national and scientific spheres to strengthen the 
red lines and to foster responsible science. 
Keywords: Biological weapons, potentially pandemic pathogens, syn-
thetic biology, neurobiology, disarmament, non-proliferation, biosecurity, 
responsible science. 
The Misuse of Biology 
The international community has laid down clear red lines about the misuse of 
biology. The two biological cornerstones of the rules of war are the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Geneva Protocol. Together, they prohibit 
the development, production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. Signed 
in 1972 and 1925 respectively, the two treaties have incorporated a mix of 
legal, diplomatic and political elements into the structure of international norms 
that are increasingly difficult to dismantle, ignore or override. 
Scientific advances in biology and biomedicine are, however, significantly 
eroding technological barriers to acquiring and using biological weapons. This 
article describes recent trends in bioscience and analyses their security implica-
tions. Three emerging fields of research that have particularly high potential for 
misuse are then considered in more detail. Continued efforts are required in 
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multilateral, national and scientific spheres to strengthen the red lines. Crucial 
areas to strengthen are (1) the international legal framework regulating bio-
logical weapons, (2) the BWC science and technology review procedure and 
(3) norms of transparency and public accountability. 
Trends in Bioscience 
There are four frequently cited security-related trends in the biological sci-
ences:1 
1. The increasing pace of advances in bioscience. Rapid advances on mul-
tiple fronts within the life sciences pose challenges for tracking and as-
sessing that progress in terms of what it means for biological weapons 
development. It is difficult to establish which areas to monitor, to an-
ticipate what new combinations of advances will result from progress 
in multiple fields and to expand the types of expertise required to 
assess new developments. 
2. The increasing convergence of biology and biomedicine with chemistry, 
engineering, mathematics, computer science and information theory. 
These developments are, for instance, enabling both the chemical syn-
thesis of biological molecules and the biological synthesis of chemicals. 
Where components are significantly different from existing biological 
systems, or where inorganic materials mimic biological function and 
thereby have biological effect, the mechanisms of action of weapons 
might not be clearly “biological” or “chemical” – blurring the domains 
of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. 
3. The increasing diffusion of capacity in biology and biomedicine around 
the world, particularly in emerging economies such as China and India. 
There are also increasing international collaborations, not only among 
researchers in scientifically developed countries and between re-
searchers in developed and developing countries, but among regional 
networks and increasingly among scientists within developing coun-
tries. 
                                                          
1 “The Biological and Toxin Weapon Trends Symposium,” IAP Global Network of Sci-
ence Academies conference, 13–15 September 2015; and “Assessing the Implica-
tions of Advances in Science and Technology for the BTW 2016,” IAP Global Security 
Working Group Meeting, 16 September 2015, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, 
Poland (a summary is available at iapbwg.pan.pl); Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, Convergence of Chemistry and Biology: Report of the Scientific 
Advisory Board’s Temporary Working Group (The Hague: OPCW, 2014); National Re-
search Council, Life Sciences and Related Fields: Trends Relevant to the Biological 
Weapons Convention (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2011); “The Bio-
logical Weapon Convention Seventh Review Conference,” 5–22 December 2011, Ge-
neva, “New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention” 
(BWC/CONF.VII/INF.3).  
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4. The increasing opening up of science with new tools like wikis, blogs 
and microblogs altering how information is gathered, handled, dis-
seminated and accessed; and amateur communities, scientific out-
reach and educational toys increasing access to hardware for wet work 
in the life sciences. A large number of multinational suppliers now pro-
duce kits containing reagents, enzymes and step-by-step instructions 
to conduct many of the basic lab techniques life scientists use, includ-
ing nucleic acid and protein expression, purification, detection and 
analysis. Commercial services are also available for tasks like sequenc-
ing, DNA and protein synthesis, microarray construction, mass spec-
trometry analysis and others. The availability of smaller, more auto-
mated and easier to use bioinstrumentation also facilitates the per-
formance of lab research. 
Impact on Bioweapons Potential 
The trends in bioscience are making it easier to develop biological weapons. 
The most recent assessment by the global network of science academies con-
cludes that technological barriers to acquiring and using bioweapons have been 
significantly eroded over the last five years.2 
It is now easier to acquire both natural and synthetic pathogens and to en-
hance and optimize them for specific purposes, including for use in biological 
weapons. It is also easier to produce biological agents. Critical lab equipment 
such as reaction vessels (including those currently covered by control lists) can 
now be fabricated using 3D printing technology. The increased use of biosyn-
thesis and bio-based production, scaffolds and “biopharming” has accelerated 
the speed and yield of biological agent production. In addition, the space and 
resources required for biologics production has decreased and the physical size 
of production equipment has been drastically reduced. Less space and time are 
now required for scale up, and it is easier to conceal nefarious activities. Ad-
vances in nanotechnology and aerobiology, along with the use of chemical co-
factors to increase uptake and formulations to improve absorption from the 
gastrointestinal tract, are making the dispersal and delivery of biological agents 
easier, and increasing antimicrobial resistance is complicating the administra-
tion of prophylactics. In short, the global network of science academies argues 
that scientific advances “could facilitate almost every step of a biological weap-
ons programme.” 3 
While the risks of small-scale bioterrorism attacks are real and present, the 
likelihood that scientific advances will be used to “enhance” these attacks is 
relatively low – many of the cutting-edge developments are expensive and 
                                                          
2 “The Biological and Toxin Weapon Trends Symposium.” 
3 Ibid. 
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complicated to acquire and deploy successfully.4 Instead, the most significant 
security threat from the misuse of advances in the biological sciences comes 
from sophisticated biological attacks from professional and well-resourced in-
stitutions like national militaries.5 This is backed by the historical record of both 
biological weapons development and bioterrorism incidents.6 
The international community has committed itself—through the BWC and 
the Geneva Protocol—to take precautions that scientific developments are not 
misused. Over the life span of the BWC, there has been no state party use of 
biological weapons, and most experts agree that the potential for state use is 
very low.7 There are various reasons cited for this: biological weapons are not 
considered “good” weapons; it is difficult to produce sophisticated and reliable 
biological weapons and it is not politically viable to use them because the norm 
against biological warfare—encoded in law through the BWC—is exceptionally 
strong. 
Yet, while the norm against biological weapons is strong, and the potential 
for state use is very low, a blanket rejection of the bioweapons threat from 
states is dangerous. It cannot be assumed that biological weapons will not be 
used in the future, and the likelihood that they will be used is not zero. Alt-
hough twentieth-century military use of biological weapons was envisioned 
primarily as strategic and came to rest on delivery by bomb, missile or large 
area spray, there were also scientists and military planners who seriously en-
tertained other ideas, such as tactical use and sabotage. One must not neces-
sarily think of biological weapons today as in the twentieth century. Biological 
warfare can, for instance, be compared with cyber warfare in that the victim 
may know it has been attacked, but not by whom, or it may not know or be 
able to prove that it has been attacked at all – the question of who is to blame 
might not even be asked. The silent and invisible nature of biological weapons 
could, for instance, make them highly potent means for weakening the legiti-
macy of enemy regimes within their own populations, or for just keeping them 
busy. In the “best case” scenario it may be possible to actually get rid of enemy 
regimes without anyone recognizing foul play. 
                                                          
4 Filippa Lentzos, “The Risk of Bioweapons Use: Considering the Evidence Base,” Bio-
Societies 9:1 (2014): 84–93; Catherine Jefferson, Filippa Lentzos, and Claire Marris, 
“Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: Challenging the ‘Myths’,’’ Frontiers in Public 
Health 2:115, http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115; “The Biological and 
Toxin Weapon Trends Symposium.” 
5 Iris Hunger, et al., “The Future of Biothreat Governance,” in Biological Threats in the 
21st Century, ed. Filippa Lentzos (London: Imperial College Press, forthcoming); Gigi 
Kwik Gronvall, “The Threat of Misuse,” in Biological Threats in the 21st Century; 
Lentzos, “The Risk of Bioweapons Use”; Jefferson, “Synthetic Biology and Biosecu-
rity.” 
6 Lentzos, Biological Threats in the 21st Century. 
7 Hunger, “The Future of Biothreat Governance”; Kwik Gronvall, “The Threat of Mis-
use”; Lentzos, “The Risk of Bioweapons Use.” 
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While the use of biology will not have military utility in all contemporary 
conflicts, the possibility that it might have military utility in a small subset of 
conflicts, along with the erosion of technological barriers to acquire and use 
bioweapons, makes it imperative that the bioweapons threat from states is 
dedicated a greater part of the collective vigil and that effective preventive 
measures are developed. 
Emerging Research Areas with High Misuse Potential 
Various efforts have been made, particularly in the United States, to character-
ize biological research with high misuse potential.8 Examples identified of such 
“dual use research of concern” include experiments that increase capacity: to 
manipulate the pathogenicity, virulence, host-specificity, transmissibility, re-
sistance to drugs, or ability to overcome host immunity to pathogens; to syn-
thesize pathogens and toxins without cultivation of microorganisms or using 
other natural sources; to identify new mechanisms to disrupt the healthy func-
tioning of humans, animals and plants; and to develop novel means of deliver-
ing biological agents and toxins. Early high-profile experiments that raised con-
cern aimed to make mousepox more deadly, synthesize poliovirus from scratch 
and reconstruct the extinct 1918 flu virus.9 More recently, entire fields of bio-
logical research have raised concern. These include potentially pandemic 
pathogens, synthetic biology and neurobiology. 
Potentially Pandemic Pathogens 
The security community’s attention was drawn to virology in 2011 when it 
transpired that two leading influenza laboratories, under the leadership of Ron 
Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka, had conducted experiments to determine 
whether H5N1 avian influenza, or “bird flu,” could become readily transmissible 
between mammals and still remain highly virulent. H5N1 does not spread easily 
from human to human, but it kills more than 50 percent of people infected. 
                                                          
8 For example: National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terror-
ism (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2004); National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity, Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual-Use Life Sci-
ences Research (Washington: NSABB, 2007); US Government Policy for Oversight of 
Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (March 2012); and US Government Policy 
for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern (September 
2014), available at http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-biotechnology-activities/biosecurity/ 
dual-use-research-concern. 
9 Ronald J. Jackson, et al., “Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectro-
melia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic Re-
sistance to Mousepox,” Journal of Virology 75 (2001): 1205–1210; Eckard Wimmer, 
“The Test-tube Synthesis of a Chemical Called Poliovirus. The Simple Synthesis of a 
Virus Has Far-reaching Societal Implications,” The European Molecular Biology Or-
ganization Reports – Special Issue 7 (2006): S3–S9; Terrence M. Tumpey, et al., 
“Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus,” Sci-
ence 310 (2005): 77–80. 
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Fouchier and Kawaoka were concerned that H5N1 could become readily 
transmissible between mammals and still remain highly virulent, and the virol-
ogists were worried that governments were not taking the threat seriously 
enough. In the summer of 2011, both groups passed H5N1 among ferrets as an 
animal model and discovered that a mutated H5N1 virus that was air transmis-
sible could indeed emerge. In other words, what they had developed in their 
labs was a novel, more contagious strain of the bird flu virus that could spread 
to humans and other mammals. 
Kathleen Vogel describes the unfolding story in some detail.10 In essence, 
Fouchier submitted his paper to the prestigious journal Science; Kawaoka fa-
vored Nature. In September 2011, Fouchier revealed his findings at a scientific 
meeting in Malta: his mutated virus was airborne and as efficiently transmitted 
as the seasonal flu virus. In public, he commented that “[t]his is a very danger-
ous virus.” 11 His funder, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), grew concerned 
about the security implications if the results were published: could bioterrorists 
(or indeed national militaries) adopt similar “gain-of-function” techniques to 
increase the pathogenicity and transmissibility of viruses? The NIH asked the 
US National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity (NSABB), the government 
advisory body on dual use life science research oversight, to review both pa-
pers. By the end of November 2011, NSABB recommended that the papers’ 
general conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be published, but that the 
manuscripts not include a methods section with details of how to carry out the 
experiments.12 This was the first time NSABB had recommended restrictions on 
scientific publications in the life sciences. 
The safety and security implications of the experiment garnered a great deal 
of media coverage. The New York Times ran an editorial with the unambiguous 
headline, “An Engineered Doomsday,” arguing that the modified flu virus could 
kill tens or hundreds of millions of people if it escaped the lab or was stolen. 
Proponents of gain-of-function research, on the other hand, argued that such 
studies help understand influenza transmission and can assist public health re-
searchers in detecting an impending flu pandemic and preparing vaccines. 
                                                          
10 Kathleen M. Vogel, “Expert Knowledge in Intelligence Assessments: Bird Flu and Bio-
terrorism,” International Security 38 (Winter 2013–2014): 39–71. 
11 Quoted in Katherine Harmon, “What Really Happened in Malta This September 
When Contagious Bird Flu Was First Announced,” Scientific American (blog), 30 
September 2011, http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/what-really-
happened-in-malta-this-september-when-contagious-bird-flu-was-first-announced/. 
In late September, an article in New Scientist, a weekly science and technology news 
magazine, first reported that Fouchier’s modified H5N1 virus was lethal to the ferrets 
in the experiments – see Debora MacKenzie, “Five Easy Mutations to Make Bird Flu a 
Lethal Pandemic,” New Scientist, 26 September 2011, www.newscientist.com/ 
article/mg21128314-600-five-easy-mutations-to-make-bird-flu-a-lethal-pandemic/. 
12 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Press Statement on the NSABB Re-
view of H5N1 Research,” NIH News, 20 December 2011, http://www.nih.gov/news/ 
health/dec2011/od-20.htm.  
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In January 2012, a prominent group of virologists wrote to NSABB to recon-
sider. NSABB published an explanation and defense in both Nature and Science. 
The primary reason for the unprecedented redaction was that “publishing 
these experiments in detail would provide information to some person, organi-
zation, or government that would help them develop similar mammal-adapted 
influenza A/H5N1 viruses for harmful purposes.” By mid-February 2012, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) convened a technical consultation on the 
Fouchier and Kawaoka experiments.13 Both scientists attended and presented 
new data related to the manuscripts. The WHO meeting agreed a temporary 
moratorium was needed to address public concerns. Fouchier and Kawaoka 
were to revise their manuscripts with new details and submit them to NSABB 
for a second security review. 
Fouchier backtracked. He then stated that his group’s mutated virus was 
not lethal when inhaled by ferrets and would not spread “like wildfire” through 
the air; rather, transmission would not be easy. He also said that most of the 
ferrets that had contracted the virus via aerosol transmission had hardly be-
come sick, and none had died. He clarified, however, that the mutated virus did 
cause disease when injected in very high concentrations into the lower respira-
tory tract of ferrets. 
In the end, NSABB recommended publication of Kawaoka’s revised paper in 
full, but some board members continued to have concerns about Fouchier’s 
paper. They felt it was “immediately and directly enabling” for terrorism (and 
biological warfare) and a “pretty complete cookbook” for causing harm. By May 
2012 Kawaoka’s paper was published in Nature. Fouchier’s paper followed suit 
and was published in Science in June 2012. 
Following the voluntary moratorium, work resumed on potentially pan-
demic pathogens in 2013, with scientists in multiple labs adding new properties 
to biological agents and creating modified variants of viruses that do not cur-
rently exist in nature. Within a short space of time, however, new papers on 
human-made H5N1 and other dangerous flu strains rekindled concerns about 
potentially pandemic pathogens created in the lab – in part because a series of 
lab accidents and breaches at the NIH and Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) raised questions about safety at high-containment labs. On 17 
October 2014, the US government stepped in, imposing a federal funding 
pause on potentially pandemic pathogen experiments and announcing an ex-
tended deliberative process, which is still on-going.14 
                                                          
13 World Health Organization, “Technical Consultation on H5N1 Research Issues – 
Consensus Points,” 16–17 February 2012, http://www.who.int/influenza/human_ 
animal_interface/consensus_points/en/index.html; and World Health Organization, 
“Public Health, Influenza Experts Agree H5N1 Research Critical but Extend Delay,” 17 
February 2012, www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2012/h5n1_research_ 
20120217/en/index.html. 
14 “U.S. Government Gain-of-Function Deliberative Process and Research Funding 
Pause on Selected Gain-of-Function Research Involving Influenza, MERS, and SARS 
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Synthetic Biology 
Many have viewed the controversy around potentially pandemic pathogens as 
a test case of what is to come when the still-emerging field of “synthetic biol-
ogy” begins to mature. Synthetic biology aims to engineer biology, or “to de-
sign and engineer biologically based parts, novel devices and systems, as well 
as redesigning existing, natural biological systems.” 15 The aspirations and pace 
of advance in synthetic biology have raised a number of security concerns. 
Some of these are legitimate, others less so.16 
One of the main trepidations raised in the political and security discourse is 
that synthetic biology is making it easier to create dangerous pathogens from 
scratch. The claim is that well-characterized biological parts can be easily ob-
tained from open-source online registries and then assembled, by people with 
no specialist training outside professional scientific institutions, into genetic 
circuits, devices and systems that will reliably perform desired functions in live 
organisms. This narrative rests on misleading assumptions about synthetic bi-
ology. 
The narrative does not reflect the situation facing people with no specialist 
training who work outside professional scientific institutions, nor does it even 
reflect current realities in academic or commercial science laboratories: aca-
demic and commercial researchers are still struggling with every stage of the 
standardization and mechanization process. More than a decade in, the trans-
lation of proof-of-concept designs into real-world applications is still a major 
challenge. As recently noted in the scientific literature surveying progress in 
synthetic biology, “The synthetic part is easy, it’s the biology part that’s con-
founding.” 17 However, even if the engineering approaches offered by synthetic 
biology make processes more systematic and more reproducible, skills do not 
become irrelevant, and all aspects of the work do not become easier. Further, 
importantly, “easier” does not mean “easy.” Aeronautical engineering provides 
a useful analogy: planes are built from a large number of well-characterized 
parts in a systematic way, but this does not mean that any member of the gen-
eral public can build a plane, make it fly and use it for commercial transporta-
tion. Thus, advances in synthetic biology do not make it easier for just anybody 
to engineer biological systems, including dangerous ones. 
                                                                                                                                        
Viruses,” 17 October 2014, http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/gain-of-
function.pdf (accessed 20 January 2016). 
15 The Royal Academy of Engineering, Synthetic Biology: Scope, Applications and 
Implications (London: The Royal Academy of Engineering, 2009).  
16 Filippa Lentzos, Catherine Jefferson, and Claire Marris, “The Myths (and Realities) of 
Synthetic Bioweapons,” The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 18 September 2014, 
http://thebulletin.org/myths-and-realities-synthetic-bioweapons7626; Jefferson, et 
al., “Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity.” 
17 Timothy S. Gardner, et al., “Synthetic Biology: From Hype to Impact,” Trends in Bio-
technology 31:3 (2013): 123–125, quoted in Nature Reviews Microbiology 12:5 
(2014): 309. 
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This leads to a second concern raised in the political and security discourse: 
that synthetic biology is breaking down the expert and non-expert boundary. In 
other words, the growth of a do-it-yourself biology (DIY bio) community, along 
with DNA synthesis becoming cheaper and easily outsourced, could make it 
easier for terrorists to obtain the basic materials to create biological threat 
agents. However, the link between synthetic biology and DIY bio, and the level 
of sophistication of the experiments typically being performed, is grossly over-
stated. DIY biologists typically comprise a wide range of participants of varying 
levels of expertise, ranging from complete novices with no prior background in 
biology to trained scientists who conduct experiments in their own time. Some 
DIY biologists work in home laboratories assembled from everyday household 
tools and second-hand laboratory equipment purchased online; the majority 
conduct their experiments in community labs or “hackerspaces.” Studies of sci-
entific practice in community labs demonstrate the challenges that amateur bi-
ologists face while trying to successfully conduct even rudimentary biological 
experiments. These amateurs particularly lack access to the shared knowledge 
available to institutional researchers, highlighting the importance of local, spe-
cialized knowledge and enculturation in laboratory practices. 
DNA synthesis is one of the key enabling technologies of synthetic biology. 
There are now a number of commercial companies that provide DNA synthesis 
services, so the process can be outsourced: a client can order a DNA sequence 
online and receive the synthesized DNA material by post within days or weeks. 
The price charged by these companies has greatly reduced over the last 20 
years and the service is now within reach of a broad range of actors. This has 
led to routine statements suggesting that it is now cheap and easy to obtain a 
synthesized version of any desired DNA sequence. 
There are, however, several challenges that need to be taken into account 
when assessing the potential for misuse that inexpensive DNA sequencing 
might enable. First, simply ordering online the full-length genome sequence of 
a small virus (or those of larger bacteria) is not currently possible. The alterna-
tive, ordering short DNA sequences and assembling them into a genome, re-
quires specialist expertise, experience and equipment available in academic la-
boratories, but not easily accessible to an amateur working from home. As 
noted by NSABB, while the “technology for synthesizing DNA is readily accessi-
ble, straightforward and a fundamental tool used in current biological re-
search … the science of constructing and expressing viruses in the laboratory is 
more complex and somewhat of an art. It is the laboratory procedures down-
stream from the actual synthesis of DNA that are the limiting steps in recover-
ing viruses from genetic material.” 18 Again, it is the biology and not the syn-
thetic part that is complicated, and DNA synthesis requires extensive training in 
basic molecular-biology techniques, such as ligation and cloning, including 
                                                          
18 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), Addressing Biosecurity Con-
cerns Related to the Synthesis of Select Agents (Bethesda, MD: National Institutes of 
Health, 2006), 4. 
Biology’s Misuse Potential 
 
 57 
hands-on experience that is not “reducible to recipes, equipment, and infra-
structure.” 19 
A third frequently voiced concern is that synthetic biology may enable radi-
cally new pathogens to be designed and synthetic biology could be used to en-
hance the virulence or increase the transmissibility of known pathogens, cre-
ating novel threat agents. Again, it is not that simple. The mousepox and bird 
flu (H5N1) experiments are frequently cited to demonstrate how dangerous 
new pathogens could be created. However, assessments of this threat tend to 
overlook a salient fact: in both these experiments, the researchers did not ac-
tually design the pathogens. With respect to H5N1, researchers had indeed 
been trying to design an air-transmissible virus variant for some time, without 
success. The ferret experiment was set up as an alternative approach, to see 
whether natural mutations could generate an air-transmissible variant. The re-
searchers had no influence on the specific mutations induced. In the mousepox 
experiment, researchers inserted the gene for interleukin-4 into the mousepox 
virus to induce infertility in mice and serve as an infectious contraceptive for 
pest control. The result—that the altered virus was lethal to mice—was unan-
ticipated by the researchers; namely, it was not designed. 
Moreover, some of the lessons that came out of the extensive Soviet pro-
gram to weaponize biological agents involve the trade-offs between improving 
characteristics that are desired in the context of a bioweapons program, such 
as virulence, and diminishing other equally desired characteristics, such as 
transmissibility or stability. Pleiotropic effects—that is, when a single gene 
affects more than one characteristic and genetic instability—are common in 
microorganisms. While it is too simple to say that increased transmissibility will 
always be associated with reduced virulence, this is often the case for strains 
produced in laboratories. As other commentators have noted, 
To create … an artificial pathogen, a capable synthetic biologist would need 
to assemble complexes of genes that, working in union, enable a microbe to 
infect a human host and cause illness and death. Designing the organism to 
be contagious, or capable of spreading from person to person, would be 
even more difficult. A synthetic pathogen would also have to be equipped 
with mechanisms to block the immunological defenses of the host, charac-
teristics that natural pathogens have acquired over eons of evolution. Given 
these daunting technical obstacles, the threat of a synthetic ‘super-patho-
gen’ appears exaggerated, at least for the foreseeable future.
20
 
In sum, it is likely, in the near future, that synthetic biology will make it pos-
sible to create dangerous viruses from scratch. However, while synthetic biol-
ogy is “deskilling” the science, it is not doing this to the extent that people with 
                                                          
19 Kathleen Vogel, “Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy 
Collide,” Social Studies of Science 36:5 (2006): 676. 
20 Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, “The Promise and Perils of Synthetic 
Biology,” The New Atlantis 25 (2006): 38. 
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no specialist training operating outside professional scientific institutions can 
assemble biological parts into circuits, devices and systems that will reliably 
perform desired functions in live organisms, and even professionals will have a 
hard time creating radically new pathogens or synthetic “super-pathogens.” 
The most significant misuse risks from synthetic biology do not, therefore, arise 
from bioterrorists, but from professional and well-resourced institutions like 
national militaries.21 
The most recent figures available on US trends in synthetic biology research 
funding indicate that two thirds of the $ 200 million invested in 2014 came from 
the Department of Defense (DoD) or its research agency DARPA.22 From an 
international security perspective, the extensive influx of military funding can 
be perceived as threatening to analysts in other countries following these de-
velopments. The DoD declared just over $655 million on national biodefense 
research in 2014; synthetic biology research would appear, then, to make up 
about a fifth of the biodefense budget.23 
Funding in other countries is also increasing rapidly. In 2014, the UK and Eu-
ropean Commission investment in synthetic biology made up nearly 30 percent 
of total Euro-American synthetic biology funding.24 Some of this European 
funding is also defense-related. In the UK, for instance, which spends twice as 
much as the European Commission on synthetic biology, the field is one of five 
emerging technologies identified by the Ministry of Defence as having the most 
potential for national security. It is crucial that military research in this field 
remain as transparent as possible to ensure there is confidence that the fine 
line between permitted defense work and non-permitted offensive work does 
not become muddled. 
Neurobiology 
Neurobiology is another emerging area with high misuse potential.25 Military 
interest in neurobiology mainly relates to enhancement, involving efforts to 
                                                          
21 Jefferson, et al., “Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity.” 
22 “US Trends in Synthetic Biology Research Funding” (Washington DC: Wilson Center, 
2015), available at http://www.synbioproject.org/site/assets/files/1386/final_web_ 
print_sept2015.pdf (accessed 20 January 2016). 
23 US Department of State, Confidence-Building Measure Return Covering 2014: Con-
vention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacte-
riological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, submitted to the 
United Nations on 15 April 2015, available at www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ 
(httpAssets)/4631533639F1D34AC1257E380046511B/$file/BWC_CBM_2015_USA_P
ublic.pdf (accessed 20 January 2016). 
24 US Trends in Synthetic Biology. 
25 National Research Council, Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and Related Technolo-
gies (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008); The Royal Society, Neurosci-
ence, Conflict and Security (London: The Royal Society, 2012), http://royalsociety.org/ 
policy/projects/brain-waves/society-policy/ (accessed 20 January 2016); Tim 
Requarth, “This is Your Brain. This Is Your Brain as a Weapon,” Foreign Policy, 14 Sep-
tember 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/14/this-is-your-brain-this-is-your-
Biology’s Misuse Potential 
 
 59 
improve the operational performance of national forces, and to degradation, 
involving efforts to diminish the performance of the enemy. 
There are various ways neurobiology might confer performance advantages 
in a military context.26 One of these is through the use of neuropharmacologi-
cal agents to enhance cognitive functions like perception, attention, learning, 
memory, language, thinking, planning and decision-making. There has been 
significant military interest in cognitive enhancement. Modafinil—discovered 
by French scientists in the 1970s and since licensed as a common treatment for 
narcolepsy, but which has also been shown to enhance working memory and 
executive functioning in non-sleep-deprived individuals—is thought to have 
been used by the French army in Iraq in the early 1990s to combat fatigue and 
by the US Air Force in 2003 to improve alertness and concentration during long 
flights.27 Military interest in sustaining and enhancing brain function and per-
formance continues, demonstrated by the large number of DARPA projects de-
voted to this goal.28 Neurobiology has also been identified by the UK Ministry 
of Defence as an important and rapidly developing field with potential rele-
vance to defense and security.29 
Degrading enemy performance through neurobiology has focused particu-
larly on the development of incapacitating biochemical agents, or so-called 
non-lethal weapons. Incapacitants generally target the central nervous system 
to reduce alertness and, as the dose increases, produce sedation, sleep, anes-
thesia and death; these are distinct from riot control agents, such as tear gas, 
which cause local irritation to eyes, skin and the respiratory tract, and have 
long been used by police forces around the world. 
Despite international agreement on the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) in 1993, there are indications of continued interest in incapacitating bio-
chemicals among a number of states. The CWC bans the use of all toxic chemi-
cals as weapons in war, but it does not prevent states from using toxic chemi-
cals such as “tear gasses” for law enforcement and domestic riot control. 
Though the range of permitted toxic chemicals is restricted by types and quan-
tities consistent with law enforcement purposes, some states have interpreted 
this law enforcement exemption to extend to incapacitating chemical agents. 
Concern over state interest in incapacitants was heightened following a case 
of actual use by the Russian Federation in October 2002.30 A group of armed 
Chechen separatists raided the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow and took approxi-
mately 800 hostages. They demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
                                                                                                                                        
brain-as-a-weapon-darpa-dual-use-neuroscience/ (accessed 20 January 2016). 
26 Royal Society, Neuroscience, Conflict and Security, Chapter 4 “Performance Enhance-
ment.” 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 6 and 35–36. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Neal Davison, “Non-Lethal” Weapons (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 12–13. 
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Chechnya and threatened to kill the hostages if their demand was not met. 
Russian Special Forces disseminated an incapacitating chemical agent—report-
edly a mixture of derivatives of the synthetic opiate fentanyl—through the ven-
tilation system of the theater, rendering both the hostages and the hostage-
takers unconscious. Shortly afterwards, the troops stormed in, killing all of the 
hostage-takers and bringing the siege to an end. 129 of the hostages died from 
use of the incapacitant and many others suffered serious and long-term injury. 
The refusal of the Russian Special Forces to disclose the identity of the inca-
pacitating agent at the time of the siege prevented emergency medical person-
nel from responding effectively. There are also indications that the Russian Fed-
eration has continued research into incapacitating biochemical agents follow-
ing this event.31 The US, too, has had a long-standing interest in incapacitating 
biochemical agents.32 
As with synthetic biology, current investments in the field of neurobiology 
are considerable. The European Commission-funded Human Brain Project, es-
tablished in 2013, has an estimated € 1 190 million price tag over ten years.33 
The US equivalent, the BRAIN Initiative, was also launched in 2013, as a public-
private partnership with about $ 100 million in the President’s Fiscal Year 2014 
Budget.34 Approximately half of the US funding comes from the DoD and 
DARPA.35 
Developments in anesthetics and neuropharmacological drug research, 
coupled with developments in drug delivery, are making precise manipulation 
of neurological function increasingly feasible and there are concerns about the 
risk incapacitants pose to the international ban on chemical weapons. Particu-
larly relevant to the BWC are bioregulators and their synthetic derivatives.36 
Bioregulators are specialized chemicals that carry messages from the brain to 
the rest of the body, between neurons or within cells, and modulate the func-
tion of the target cell or organ. They are naturally occurring biochemical com-
pounds, such as hormones, neurotransmitters or signaling factors that control 
vital homeostatic systems like temperature, sleep, blood pressure, heart rate 
and immune response. However, while they occur naturally in the body at low 
concentrations, they can be extremely toxic at higher concentrations or if the 
molecular structure is changed. While many bioregulators tend to be unstable 
in aerosolized form and are rapidly broken down by enzymes in the body, engi-
neered variants could be synthetized, and considerable developments have 
                                                          
31 Royal Society, Neuroscience, Conflict and Security. 
32 Ibid.  
33 The Human Brain Project: A Report to the European Commission (Lausanne: The HBP-
PS Consortium, 2012), https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/documents/10180/ 
17648/TheHBPReport_LR.pdf (accessed 20 January 2016). 
34 The White House, “Fact Sheet: BRAIN Initiative,” 2 April 2013, www.whitehouse.gov/ 
the-press-office/2013/04/02/fact-sheet-brain-initiative (accessed 20 January 2016). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Royal Society, Neuroscience, Conflict and Security, 49–50. 
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taken place in the in vitro synthesis of bioregulators for pharmaceutical pur-
poses. Aerosol technology is also advancing rapidly and is already in use to de-
liver effective inhaled drug therapy for the treatment of disease.37 Propellant 
metered-dose inhalers, dry powder inhalers and nebulizers are used to deliver 
drugs directly to the lungs, promoting rapid absorption into the blood. Ad-
vances in research into inhalation based methods of drug and vaccine delivery 
may also offer potential applications in the delivery of bioregulators. With ad-
vances in neurobiology, it may eventually become possible to develop modified 
bioregulators that can be disseminated over large crowds of people and that 
will cross the blood-brain barrier to induce states of sleep, confusion, placidity, 
fear, addiction or aggression.38 
The European Human Brain Project has made an explicit commitment not to 
take funds from the military or to develop applications with military objec-
tives.39 It also has an “ethics and society” component that aims “to explore the 
project’s social, ethical and philosophical implications, promote engagement 
with decision-makers and the general public, foster responsible research and 
innovation by raising social and ethical awareness among projects partners and 
ensure that the project complies with relevant legal and ethical norms.” 40 To 
date, there are no such equivalent efforts underway in the American program. 
Fostering Responsible Science 
Pandemic pathogens, synthetic biology and neurobiology are three fields of 
bioscience that have particularly high potential for misuse. There are, of 
course, also other areas of research with misuse potential. While the BWC and 
Geneva Protocol provide a legal and normative frame, continued efforts are 
required in multilateral, national and scientific spheres to strengthen the red 
lines about the misuse of biology. Crucial areas to strengthen are (1) the in-
ternational legal framework regulating biological weapons, (2) the BWC science 
and technology review procedure and (3) norms of transparency and public ac-
countability. 
1. Strengthen the international legal framework regulating biological 
weapons 
Article IV of the BWC commits Member States to both prohibit and prevent bi-
ological weapons activities. This means they are not only obliged to respond to 
prohibited activities but also to stop them from happening. An important 
mechanism of enforcement is criminalization. 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 50. 
38 Ibid.  
39 https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/documents/10180/538356/HBP_FPA_PRINT_ 
29-07-14.pdf (accessed 20 January 2016). 
40 https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/discover/ethics (accessed 20 January 2016). 
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Criminalization at the international level, as an international crime or war 
crime, provides the strongest and most effective measure for individual liability 
for violations of international law. Neither weaponization of biology nor use of 
biological weapons has been comprehensively criminalized in the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC).41 The use of “poison or poisoned 
weapons,” a prohibition first codified in 1899, is stipulated as a war crime.42 An-
other paragraph is derived from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, making the use of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all “analogous liquids, materials or 
devices” a war crime. The provision notably does not refer to the use of bacte-
riological weapons, which is prohibited in the Geneva Protocol, and makes no 
further reference to either chemical or biological weapons. Some commenta-
tors maintain that biological weapons are nevertheless included – relying on 
the premise that the term “poisoned weapon” was the first prohibition of both 
chemical and biological weapons.43 However, most commentators conclude 
that biological weapons are not included in the Rome Statute.44 The absence of 
a provision explicitly making the use of biological weapons a war crime under 
the Rome Statute is a striking gap in the international legal regulation of bio-
logical weapons and must swiftly be rectified. 
2. Strengthen the BWC science and technology review procedure 
Developments in science and technology play a fundamental role in the contin-
ued relevance of the BWC. These developments are, however, highly technical 
in nature, and the process through which BWC Member States identify science 
and technology developments and assess their implications must reflect this. 
Whilst the current intersessional work program of the treaty provides limited 
time and space to comprehensively deal with science and technology chal-
lenges, addressing these issues primarily within the policy work of the treaty 
further complicates efforts. More time and a different environment are needed. 
A dedicated technical body such as an open-ended working group with its 
chair and vice chairs appointed for several years at a time would help insulate 
technical discussions from policy considerations. The group should be expert-
                                                          
41 Use of biological weapons will in many cases be covered by other provisions, such as 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, article 8(2)b) (xx), prohibiting 
methods and materials of warfare that are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or 
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been agreed to the provision. See Filippa Lentzos and Cecilie Hellestveit, “The Cate-
gorical Ban on Bioweapons: Challenged by Synthetic Biology?” in High-Tech War and 
International Law, ed. Guglielmo Verdirame, et. al. (forthcoming). 
42 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article (2)(b)(xvii). 
43 Michael Cottier,“War Crimes: Article 5,” in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, ed. Otto Triffterer, 
2nd edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), 413. 
44 Markus Wagner, “The ICC and its Jurisdiction – Myths, Misperceptions and Realities,” 
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led and inclusive, open to all signatories and to academies of science and other 
relevant organizations that could help in making these collective judgments. 
This would help ensure that discussions remain technical, that the conclusions 
reached are factual and that any recommendations made have a sound scien-
tific basis. Clear topics for consideration include potentially pandemic patho-
gens, synthetic biology and neurobiology, as well as the increasing convergence 
of biology with other fields, particularly with chemistry, and the implications of 
this for arms control and international law. 
The group should meet separately from the Meeting of Experts in a restruc-
tured intersessional process and feed its recommendations to the member 
states directly. It needs to be adequately resourced and a scientific secretary 
should be appointed to provide continuous professional support. It should have 
a mandate as an organ of the Convention carrying forward the science and 
technology review function envisaged from the start in Article XII, but on a 
more systematic basis. 
3. Strengthen norms of transparency and public accountability 
The life science community plays a crucial role in sustaining biological dis-
armament and non-proliferation. The health of the BWC rests on individual life 
scientists and the systems and safeguards where they work, on an awareness 
of dual-use problems and structures to encourage responsible behavior, on bi-
osafety and biosecurity and all the elements of good practice for those engaged 
in relevant science and technology. Key to this is education. Not education in 
the sense of implanting facts and knowledge and instructing people in what to 
think, but education in the sense of eliciting understanding and teaching people 
how to think for themselves. It is about equipping life scientists with sensitivity 
to the risk that the knowledge gained from the experiments and research they 
carry out can be misused. 
Education, however, is not an end in itself; in this case, it would rather pro-
vide an avenue by which to affect behavior. The ultimate aim is that life scien-
tists behave responsibly, as well as provide a layer of oversight about the work 
carried out in their laboratories and in their specialized fields. The rapid pace 
and nature of change in the life sciences today means that anyone other than 
practicing life scientists is hard-pressed to have the sort of current, technical 
expertise required to provide adequate oversight. Education and awareness-
raising efforts must, therefore, go hand-in-hand with the development of sup-
portive structures and professional practices for flagging any suspect activities 
or worrying advances in the field. 
Although life scientists may feel autonomous in their work, most remain 
susceptible to larger institutional and political pressures. Whether in academic 
medical centers, pharmaceutical companies or government facilities, they work 
in settings where norms, professional responsibilities and missions are bureau-
cratically defined. However, these scientific communities also respond to na-
tional norms concerning transparency and public accountability. BWC signato-
ries must therefore view national implementation of the treaty within states, 
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and transparency and compliance assurance mechanisms between states, as 
vehicles for promoting norms of transparency and public accountability and for 
fostering responsible science. 
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